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THE BRITISH RATIFICATION OF THE UNDERWATER HERITAGE 
CONVENTION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
 
HAYLEY ROBERTS* 
 
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 
2001 came into force in 2009, providing a much-needed international legal 
framework for the protection of underwater cultural heritage (UCH). This paper 
explores the reasons why the UK has neglected to ratify the Convention and why 
accession should now be prioritized. In doing so, the article reconciles the UK’s 
stance with the agreement; moving the State into a position where it can reconsider 
ratification. In this context, it examines the definition of UCH and the purpose of 
the Convention, the extension of sovereign immunity for wrecked warships, and the 
likelihood of creeping coastal State jurisdiction beyond the competences conferred 
by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This transformative analysis moves 
forward the debate on these issues and is of international significance to States that 
have been similarly hesitant to ratify the Convention until now. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For primarily technological reasons, historic shipwrecks have only relatively recently 
emerged as a distinct regulatory problem. It is just in the last 60 years, with the increase 
of SCUBA diving and related technology, that the need for a legislative framework to 
protect underwater cultural heritage (UCH) has become more prevalent. The discovery 
of a number of Spanish galleons in the 1970s brought about a new era of treasure 
hunters,1 highlighting the increasing vulnerability of underwater heritage and raising 
the profile of ‘commercial archaeology’, where this new science was used to recover 
artefacts and sell them for profit. 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS)2 was drafted to 
codify and develop international law relating to the sea, setting out a tiered system of 
regulation in its maritime zones. This provides that the level of jurisdiction that States 
have over archaeological objects depends on their geographical location. Generally, the 
closer an object is to a State, the greater the degree of legislative and enforcement 
jurisdiction the State may exert. However, UNCLOS largely fails to address the specific 
needs of UCH and only refers to it in two broad articles.3 
                                                 
*Lecturer in Public International Law at Bangor University. The author would like to thank Alison 
Mawhinney and Yvonne McDermott Rees for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this article, 
and Ulrike Guerin for providing some statistical information. Many thanks also to the anonymous 
reviewers at ICLQ, and to Elfyn Roberts for listening to countless monologues on the subject matter. 
Any errors are, of course, the author’s own.  
 
1 For example, the Nuestra Senora de Atocha. See Treasure Salvors I 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Circuit 
1978). 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396 (UNCLOS). 
3 Arts 149 and 303, UNCLOS. Art 149 provides that all objects of an archaeological nature found in the 
Area shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole. Art 303 provides that States 
have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological nature found at sea and shall cooperate in doing so. 
The latter also creates a legal fiction to give coastal States jurisdiction over such heritage in the 
contiguous zone. 
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Shipwrecks in internal waters and the territorial sea will be subject to the laws 
of the coastal State, and although Articles 149 and 303 provide some protection in the 
Area and the contiguous zone respectively, UNCLOS is silent on how UCH should be 
managed in these zones. This leaves a clear geographical gap where archaeological 
objects are left vulnerable to unregulated interference; a legal vacuum thus exists for 
the protection of UCH in a large expanse of water, stretching from the seaward limit of 
the contiguous zone4 to the outer boundary of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).5 As 
a result, UNCLOS has been heavily criticized for promoting a ‘freedom of fishing’ for 
such objects.6 
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage 2001 (UNESCO Convention) 7 was introduced to provide a much-needed 
international framework to properly regulate interference with UCH in all maritime 
zones. The Convention has found support for its general principles amongst most 
States, however ratification has been slow amongst major maritime powers and the UK 
is yet to become a party. At the time of signature, the UK had many concerns with the 
Convention that it viewed as barriers to ratification, stating later that it ‘has ceased to 
discuss, yet alone explore, with interested parties the possibility of modifying its stance 
in the future.’8  
Stakeholders have been working to compel the UK to ratify the Convention for 
a number of years, including the European Commission, which encouraged member 
States to ratify in 2006,9 and the United Nations General Assembly in 2016.10 Two 
meetings at Burlington House,11 held in 2005 and 2010, were dedicated to promoting 
the UK’s acceptance of the treaty resulting in the Burlington House Declaration.12 In 
2013, the British Academy and the Honor Frost Foundation convened a joint Steering 
Committee of archaeologists and UCH experts, resulting in the publication of an 
independent Impact Review13 by the UK UNESCO 2001 Convention Review Group.14 
                                                 
4 If a State even decides to claim a contiguous zone in the first place. The UK, for example, does not. 
5 States have the right to claim a territorial sea not exceeding 12 nautical miles from the baseline (Art 3 
UNCLOS), a contiguous zone not exceeding 24 nautical miles from the baseline (Art 33 UNCLOS) and 
an EEZ not exceeding 200 nautical miles from the baseline (Art 57 UNCLOS). Baselines are determined 
in accordance with Arts 5-7 UNCLOS.  
6 See generally, T Scovazzi ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and Underwater Cultural Heritage’ (2012) 
27 IJMCL 753. Art 303 also upholds the law of salvage.  
7 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (adopted 2 November 2001, entered 
into force 2 January 2009) UNESCO Doc.31C/Resolution 24; (2002) 41 ILM 37.  
8 MV Williams, ‘UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: An 
Analysis of the United Kingdom’s Standpoint’ (The UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: Proceedings of the Burlington House Seminar, London, October 2005) 
10. 
9 EC Green Paper, ‘Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European Vision for the Ocean 
and Seas (Brussels, 7 June 2006) Doc. COM (2006) 275 final, Volume II – Annex, 48. 
10 UNGA Res A/RES/71/257. This is a turnaround indeed, as UNGA initially failed to endorse the 
Convention’s final text.  
11  The meetings were attended by delegates from UK Government departments, national heritage 
agencies and key voluntary bodies.  
12 The Burlington House Declaration asks the Government to ratify the Convention. For the full text of 
the Burlington House Declaration, see < 
http://www.jnapc.org.uk/Burlington%20House%20Proceedings%20final%20text.pdf>. 
13 UK UNESCO 2001 Convention Review Group, ‘The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001: An Impact Review for the United Kingdom’ (2014) ISBN 978-0-
904608-03-8. 
14 Comprising underwater archaeologists and policy experts within the field. The Final Report of the 
Review provides a balanced analysis of administrative and policy implications in ratifying the 
Convention, ibid 12.  
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A Briefing Note on the case for UK ratification was published subsequently in March 
2014,15 building on the work of the Impact Review and highlighting the importance of 
safeguarding UK interests in historic shipwrecks around the world.16 In 2015, a Policy 
Brief published by the UK National Commission for UNESCO17 recommended that 
the UK Government should reevaluate whether it should ratify the Convention.18 
There was renewed hope in March 2016 when the Government made a 
commitment to review its position on the Convention. 19 However, on 31 October 2017, 
the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) made a disappointing 
announcement that will surely come back to haunt it. The Government noted that it has 
had to reconsider its priorities and its ability to carry out a review in the light of 
changing circumstances. It stated, ‘we have decided to defer the review while we focus 
our efforts and resources on delivering new and more immediate priorities’, but that it 
remains committed to reviewing its position when priorities and resources permit.20  
Strengthening and safeguarding the protection of underwater heritage is an 
immediate priority. Technological developments have made shipwrecks increasingly 
accessible – and increasingly vulnerable – to interference by treasure hunters and 
salvors.21 A Royal Navy Loss List,22 published in 2014, indicated that there are over 
4,747 Royal Navy wrecks from the period 1600-1945 in oceans all over the world. The 
assessment also shows that as many as two-thirds of these wrecks are World War I and 
World War II losses. As these wrecks reach the 100-year threshold to fall within the 
remit of the UNESCO Convention, and so eligible for greater protection, ratifying the 
Agreement becomes more significant than ever. Treasure salvors, metal looters and 
grave robbers are not moved by government priorities. 
Against this background, this paper rigorously examines the validity of the three 
main reasons that have historically been put forward by the UK to justify its non-
ratification of the Convention: that the Convention contains an overly broad definition 
of UCH, erodes the sovereign immunity principle for wrecked warships, and 
incorporates a creeping coastal State jurisdiction. This analysis intends to place the UK 
in a more cognizant position from which to review ratification, and given that these are 
also the most common objections raised by maritime States, this article aims to unpack 
those key arguments whilst considering their broader significance. In the context of the 
UK’s most recent standpoint on the Convention, this paper also continually maintains 
                                                 
15 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: the case for UK 
ratification (March 2014) < http://honorfrostfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2001-
Convention-The-Case-for-Ratification-FINAL.pdf>.  
16 ibid 3.  
17 United Kingdom National Commission for UNESCO, ‘UNESCO Convention on the Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: Next steps for the UK government’ (March 2015) Policy Brief 17.  
18 ibid 5.  
19 DCMS, ‘The Culture White Paper’ (March 2016) 46. This was followed by a response to a written 
parliamentary question in November 2016, which stated that the ‘Government remains committed to 
reconsidering the case for ratification of the [Convention]’ and that a decision on timescales would be 
made late Spring 2017 <http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-
statements/written-question/Commons/2016-11-21/53922/>. 
20 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport written statement, HC Deb, 31 October 2017, cWS.  
21 As examined in greater detail below in Part 3, a number of WWI wrecks from the Battle of Jutland 
have already been salvaged for metal. Over the last few years, a number of British WWII wrecked 
warships have also disappeared from the Java Sea, again salvaged for metal. See, for example, K Lamb, 
‘Lost bones, a mass grave and war wrecks plundered off Indonesia’ The Guardian (London, 28 February 
2018). Lamb reports that salvors have recovered the bones of Allied soldiers killed in action in WWII.   
22 Final Report (n 13), Royal Navy Loss List, Annex 2. 
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that this volte-face is a regressive step and emphasizes the importance of prioritizing 
ratification. 
Section II will first outline the main provisions of the Convention and its 
drafting history, before examining the three objections in detail in Section III. Section 
IV offers some concluding remarks, arguing that the UK’s retrograde position on the 
Convention should be promptly reassessed.  
 
 
 
II. NEGOTIATING BACKGROUND & OUTLINE OF MAIN PROVISIONS 
 
The Cultural Heritage Committee of the International Law Association (ILA) had been 
working on a draft Convention since 1988 as a response to the growing concerns 
regarding UCH, prior to transmitting the matter to UNESCO, which it felt was the most 
appropriate body to take action. The UNESCO Executive Board at its 141st session 
requested the Director-General to consider the feasibility of an international instrument 
on the protection of UCH. 23  The resulting feasibility study noted that the ‘recent 
accessibility of underwater wrecks has been followed by severe looting’24 and that the 
‘situation of the cultural heritage outside the territorial sea is now critical.’25 It was also 
observed that little time was spent on the issue during UNCLOS discussions, as it was 
not dealt with until the final days of lengthy negotiations. 26 Amendments to both 
UNCLOS and the UNESCO World Heritage Convention were considered,27 but as 
UNCLOS applies to general rules on the law of the sea, and the World Heritage 
Convention applies to heritage of outstanding universal significance within a State’s 
territory, neither was contemplated to be a good solution.  
The UNESCO Executive Board convened a group of experts to debate the 
proposals outlined by the study and report to the next General Conference. This group 
of experts convened in May 1996 and consensus was reached that a new international 
instrument was required. Upon the invitation of the 29th UNESCO General Conference, 
the Director-General assembled a meeting of governmental experts and representatives 
of international organizations to prepare a first draft.28 The final text was adopted by 
the General Conference and approved by States in 2001, despite the fact that they were 
unable to reach unanimity on the whole text. Strong opposition was provided by Russia, 
the USA29 and Norway as they considered the Convention to be a radical departure 
from the ‘delicate balance of UNCLOS.’30  
The Convention applies to UCH, as defined in Article 1(a); ‘“Underwater 
cultural heritage” means all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or 
                                                 
23 Decisions adopted by the Executive Board at its 141st Session, Paris, 17 June 1993 UNESCO Doc. 141 
EX/Decisions, 34. 
24 Feasibility Study for the Drafting of a New Instrument for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage, Paris, 23 March 1995, UNESCO Doc.146 EX/27, para 9. 
25 ibid para 27.  
26 ibid para 13. 
27 ibid paras 41-2. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
(adopted 23 November 1972, entered into force 15 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 151. 
28 Decision on the Report by the Director-General on the Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, UNESCO document 141 EX/SR 15 para 15. 
29 Despite not being a member of UNESCO at that time.  
30 R Garabello, ‘The Negotiating History of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’ in R Garabello & T Scovazzi (eds), The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage before 
and after the 2001 UNESCO Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 92.  
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archaeological character which have been partially or totally under water, periodically 
or continuously, for at least 100 years…’ Eleven objectives and general principles of 
the Convention are set out in Article 2, ensuring that State Parties cooperate to protect 
UCH, that in situ preservation of UCH is considered as the first option, and that any 
recovered UCH is conserved and managed to its long-term preservation. Article 3 notes 
that no provisions affect the rights of States under international law, and that they shall 
be interpreted in a way that is consistent with UNCLOS.  
Some of the Convention’s most important articles provide that UCH shall not 
be commercially exploited.31 It is clear that although Article 4 attempts to exclude the 
undesirable aspects of salvage law, it was not possible for the Convention to exclude 
its use altogether as identifiable owners should not be denied of their property rights. A 
compromise is made in Article 4 that UCH can only be subject to salvage law if it is 
authorized by the competent authorities, is in full conformity with the Convention, and 
it ensures that any recovery of UCH achieves its maximum protection. Articles 7 to 12 
of the Convention regulate activity in the maritime zones as set out by UNCLOS, and 
also provide for reporting and notification in such areas. Article 18 provides for the 
seizure and disposition of UCH. This paper examines many of these provisions below.  
It was considered that a set of archaeological standards for activities directed at 
UCH should be formulated separately from the Convention so that they may be easily 
amended if required. It was ultimately decided that agreeing on a process for amending 
separate archaeological guidelines would be much more complex,32 and so they were 
incorporated as a formal part of the Convention in the Annex. These guidelines are 
viewed as an excellent framework for the protection and responsible recovery of UCH, 
and are even supported by many States not party to the Convention.33 
 
 
III. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
 
The UNESCO Convention, as illustrated by the numerous disagreements over drafts,34 
is a contentious instrument for a number of reasons. These reasons have prevented some 
traditional maritime nations, such as the UK, USA, Norway and Russia, from signing 
the Convention. The ratification of the Convention by such States is instrumental to the 
success of the Convention, given that all are active flag States. 35 Despite receiving 87 
approvals in the original vote, the Convention took eight years to enter into force and 
at the time of writing only has 58 State party ratifications fifteen years on.  
At the initial vote in Paris, States had many different reasons for their 
abstentions or negative votes. For example, Sweden abstained from voting on the 
Convention as ‘the consensus goal stumbled over two crucial issues: jurisdiction and 
State vessels.’36 Similarly, the USA, although not a member of UNESCO at the time of 
                                                 
31 For example, Art 2(7) and Rule 2 Annex. 
32 Garabello (n 30). 
33  For example, the UK. See UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage: UK Explanation of Vote’ United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office: 2001. 
34 See generally, Garabello (n 30). 
35 Notable non-parties include Australia, China, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, 
Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Turkey, the UAE, the UK, and 
the USA. These States either have a large number of vessels in their registries, a large number of wrecks 
in their jurisdictional waters, or possess the technology to salvage UCH. Many of their reasons for non-
membership are explained below in Part 3. Notable State parties include France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, 
all of which have a rich maritime history.  
36 ibid 250.  
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the vote, declared it would have not accepted the Convention regardless, due to a 
number of concerns mainly regarding jurisdiction and the threat to sovereign 
immunity.37  
The UK’s ratification is key to influencing developments, particularly given its 
geographical position in Northern Europe, where it has been identified that a lack of 
ratifications around the North Sea may pose an obstacle for the effectiveness of the 
Convention. 38  However, the UK has identified a number of problems that have 
prevented it from doing so, namely that the Convention possesses: 
1. an over-inclusive definition of UCH;  
2. a threat to the sovereign immunity principle; and  
3. the potential for creeping jurisdiction that upsets the delicate balance of rights 
set out in UNCLOS.39  
Each of these issues is examined and resolved below, incorporating arguments for 
the prioritization of ratification into the analysis to drive forward the debate on 
reviewing the Convention.40  
 
 
A. Over-inclusive Definition of Underwater Cultural Heritage 
 
As outlined in Article 1 of the Convention, ‘underwater cultural heritage means all 
traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological character 
which have been partially or totally underwater, periodically or continuously, for at 
least 100 years.’41 The inclusion of a time limit is important given that salvage law 
operates in many jurisdictions, and a clear division is required to determine when 
salvage would cease to apply and when the Convention’s provisions would begin, 
particularly as the Convention renders salvage law inapplicable in most 
circumstances.42 In King & Chapman v “La Lavia,” “Juliana” and “Santa Maria de 
la Vision”43 Mr Justice Barr stated that it seems ‘when so much time has elapsed since 
the original loss of a vessel … then the wreck should be regarded as having passed from 
the commercial realm of maritime salvage into the domain of archaeological law.’  
It could be argued that any trace of human existence over 100 years old could be 
categorized as having a ‘cultural, historical or archaeological character’, as ‘character’ 
does not necessarily mean that the object has importance or value. The question of a 
significance criterion within the definition of UCH proved to be a contentious matter 
during negotiations,44 but it was generally accepted by most States that ‘character’ 
                                                 
37 ibid 252.  
38 UCH/17.6.MSP/3, 14. In 2016, the Netherlands officially announced its intention to ratify, stating that 
‘the urgency to protect the underwater cultural heritage at the international level is high’ < 
https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2016/05/19/the-netherlands-will-protect-the-underwater-
cultural-heritage>.   
39 See UK Explanation of Vote (n 33).  
40 The Impact Review referred to above considers provisions that may present challenges in terms of 
requiring new administrative arrangements or reallocation of resources. As these are more typically 
heritage management issues rather than substantive points of law, they will not be considered in this 
paper. 
41 Art 1(a), emphasis added. It should be noted that the Convention’s operational guidelines suggest that 
a State can choose to apply the provisions to objects and sites under 100 years, Operational Guidelines 
for the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, CLT/HER/CHP/OG 1/REV 
(August 2015) 4.    
42 For example, Art 4. See also above (n 31).  
43 [1986] No 11076, 11077, 11078 P (Transcript) (Ir H Ct 1994). 
44 Garabello (n 30) 106-9.  
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sufficiently limited the scope of the Convention.45 The UK, however, perceived this to 
be an extremely broad definition of UCH and ultimately this was given as a reason why 
the UK could not agree to the final text: 
   
the text obliges signatory States to extend the same very high standards of 
protection to all underwater archaeology over 100 years old. It is estimated there 
are probably about 10,000 wreck sites on the seabed under the [UK]’s territorial 
sea and it would neither be possible nor desirable to extend legal protection to all 
of them. The [UK] believes it is better to focus its efforts and resources on 
protecting the most important & unique examples of underwater cultural heritage. 
It would simply be impossible to enforce the application of the rules in the Annex 
to every one of the thousands of wreck sites. 46  
 
To try and move the UK towards a more informed position from which to reconsider 
ratification, the UK’s explanation of vote will be analysed, focusing on three key issues: 
1. A fundamental misunderstanding of the Convention’s provisions and purpose  
2. An overestimation of the number of wrecks to be protected  
3. An apparent willingness to accept a broad definition of cultural heritage in 
other legal instruments 
 
 
1. A fundamental misunderstanding of the Convention 
 
To understand the rationale behind the UK’s position on the Convention, one must 
appreciate its method of heritage protection, which is a site-based, selective approach. 
Although there now exists some divergence in the way that wreck sites are protected in 
the devolved nations,47 previously the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 had regulated 
this issue on a national level. Under this statute, applications must be made for wrecks 
to be formally designated and even then, they must be of ‘historical, archaeological or 
artistic importance.’48 This approach is responsive, meaning that a wreck must first be 
discovered before it can be designated and protected, and thus far, only 63 wrecks have 
successfully met these criteria. Any person wishing to engage with these sites must then 
apply to the relevant heritage body for a license.  
The notion of significance has been a central factor in the UK’s policy on 
heritage protection. As the Convention does not include such a criterion, the UK 
interpreted Article 1 to mean that it would have to extend the same level of protection 
– and resources – to every shipwreck on the territorial seabed, of which it estimated 
there to be 10,000.49 Presumably this position is founded upon fears of a significant, 
and likely unquantifiable, financial burden and legislative disruption. This is a 
misconception of what the Convention proposes to achieve, based upon the erroneous 
view that the site-based approach is the only strategy, and resulting in the belief that 
the UK would be required to designate all UCH that fell within the, prima facie, broad 
definition. This misconception could be the result of a non-specialist UK delegation at 
                                                 
45 ibid 109.  
46 UK Explanation of Vote (n 33).  
47 Although the semantics of the UK’s devolved settlement are largely outside the scope of this particular 
paper, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have the required legislative competence to create their own 
legislation over heritage matters.  
48 Section 1 Protection of Wrecks Act 1973, emphasis added.  
49 An earlier figure in the negotiations was given as half a million wrecks, see Garabello (n 30) 108. 
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the UNESCO consultation meetings. 50  Those present lacked any archaeological 
background or qualifications, and the delegation did not include any broader 
representation from NGOs either. 51 The only specialist advice provided at the time was 
legal and provided by FCO lawyers.52 
The Convention makes no mention of protecting individual sites, rather it takes 
an activity-based approach. This means that the aim of the Convention is not protecting 
UCH by designating all sites that fall within the definition, rather it is to protect UCH 
by regulating activities directed at UCH. Other States appeared to grasp this concept 
more easily during negotiations, with Canada, for example, noting during the adoption 
of the text that ‘[the] work has resulted in a text that is focused on “activities directed 
at” underwater cultural heritage.’53 
Article 7(2) imposes a duty on State parties to ensure the Rules in the Annex 
are applied to activities directed at UCH in the territorial sea. Such activities are defined 
in Article 1(6) as having UCH as their primary object and which may, directly or 
indirectly, physically disturb or otherwise damage UCH. This definition narrows the 
scope of activities further still, as they must satisfy two criteria to fit the remit of the 
obligation: having UCH as the primary object, and physically disturbing or damaging 
UCH. Moreover, Article 2(4) states that ‘State Parties shall…take all appropriate 
measures…that are necessary to protect [UCH], using for this purpose the best 
practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities.’54 The 
measures to be taken in each instance should be determined as appropriate. Read in its 
entire context, it seems difficult to understand how this could have been an obstacle. 
This approach could procure a highly flexible and context-specific approach to 
address the individual needs of particular UCH within the capabilities of the UK. The 
most significant wrecks could still be afforded statutory protection using a site-based 
approach, but there is scope within the Convention’s provisions to exercise judgment 
in safeguarding non-designated wrecks. The UK expressly recognizes that the absence 
of designation does not lower significance.55 Where UCH falls within the Convention’s 
definition but the UK does not deem designation necessary, the State’s obligations 
would simply be to regulate activities with UCH as the primary object that may result 
in physical disturbance, as outlined in Article 7(2). The UK already has a system in 
place regulating marine activities, which is capable of incorporating the obligation with 
little legislative change.  
The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 and the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010 
provide a mode of regulating marine activities. Licenses are required in the UK’s 
inshore areas56 for various activities, such as removing an object from the seabed using 
a vessel or floating container. Many of the activities for which the Convention is 
directed at will fall within the existing requirements for a marine license. This means 
that the additional number of activities requiring regulation under the Convention will 
be very small, particularly as they need to have UCH as the primary object and involve 
                                                 
50 Williams (n 8) 2. 
51 ibid. Williams notes that the division in opinion between interested parties to the draft Convention may 
explain the lack of NGO representation that many other States had.   
52 ibid.  
53 Garabello (n 30) 242. 
54 Emphasis added.  
55 UK Marine Policy Statement (March 2011) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69322/pb3654-marine-
policy-statement-110316.pdf> 22. 
56 Granted by the Marine Management Organisation (England), DAERA (Northern Ireland), Marine 
Scotland, Natural Resources Wales.  
  9 
physical disturbance of that heritage. Currently a license is not required to remove 
something from the seabed by hand,57 but it would be relatively straightforward to add 
provisions whereby a license is required if the activity falls within the Convention’s 
criteria. Such provision would also ensure that where intrusive work is carried out it 
will be done in accordance with archaeological standards, such is the obligation in 
Article 7(2). Activities falling outside of this scope would not require regulation, such 
as fishing, dredging, and non-intrusive wreck diving. 58  The Convention does not 
restrict divers, but ensures that physical intervention conforms to archaeological 
standards where UCH is concerned.  
 
 
2. Overestimation of the number of wrecks 
 
The UK explanation of its vote alludes to ‘probably 10,000 wreck sites on the seabed 
under the UK’s territorial sea’59 and declares that protecting all of these would be 
impossible. In actuality, there is significant evidence that the number of known wrecks 
in the territorial sea that fall within the Convention’s definition is substantially lower 
than the estimate noted by the UK. The number of wrecks known to be over 100 years 
old is less than one thousand,60 and by 2018 will be approximately 2,800 owing to the 
large number of ships sunk in battle during WWI.61 Firth notes that wrecks dating prior 
to 1860 are so rare that they are highly likely to be significant for one reason or 
another.62  
Let us assume that the UK is correct that the number of wrecks is 10,000 and 
all of them require designation. Even then it is difficult to see how it would ‘simply be 
impossible’ to enforce the Convention’s rules when comparing UCH to terrestrial sites. 
Where an activity may affect a scheduled monument or listed building, an application 
for Scheduled Monument Consent (SMC) or Listed Building Consent must be made. 
Collectively, there are approximately 34,000 scheduled monuments across the UK,63 
with hundreds of thousands of listed buildings. With this in mind, the provisions of the 
Convention are not impossible. UCH is much less accessible than land sites, and is 
likely to be subject to less interference and activity as a result.  
In any event, as the Convention does not implement a site-based approach, the 
number of wrecks in the UK’s territorial sea falling within the definition becomes 
immaterial. The focus should be shifted to the number of activities directed at UCH. 
Firth notes that the likely number of licensable activities each year will be very low, 
amounting only to a few tens, especially if the licensable activities through the 
                                                 
57 However, other legislation must be complied with, e.g. Protection of Wrecks Act 1973, Protection of 
Military Remains Act 1986.  
58 There is an obligation in Art 5 on State Parties to use the best practicable means at its disposal to 
prevent or mitigate any adverse effects that might arise from activities under its jurisdiction incidentally 
affecting UCH. Such activities are defined in Art 1(7) as not having UCH as their primary object. 
59 Emphasis added.  
60  A Firth, ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage off England: character and significance’ (Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage in International Waters Adjacent to the UK: Proceedings of the JNAPC 
21st Anniversary Seminar, London, November 2010) 17. 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid. This means that they would likely be designated by the UK in any case. 
63  Figures available at <https://www.communities-ni.gov.uk/articles/scheduled-monuments#toc-0>, 
<http://cadw.gov.wales/historicenvironment/protection/monuments/?lang=en>, 
<https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/what-is-designation/scheduled-monuments/>, 
<https://www.historicenvironment.scot/advice-and-support/listing-scheduling-and-
designations/scheduled-monuments/types-of-scheduled-monument/>.  
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Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 are set aside.64 Non-intrusive activities and those not 
having UCH as their primary purpose fall outside the Convention’s scope.  
This ‘blanket approach’ means that the system can protect heritage sites prior 
to discovery. The problem with a site-based, reactive system is that interference can 
occur between discovery and designation. For example, the HMS Association was 
discovered prior to the enactment of the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 and news of 
the discovery brought about salvors who recovered over 2,000 artefacts, leaving the 
wreck in such a state that when the Act came into force she was considered not worth 
protecting.  
In terms of cost, blanket protection has shown to be the most convenient and 
effective administrative procedure for the protection of UCH. 65  Assessment of 
significance requires effort and is likely to involve extensive physical intervention. In 
Australia, historic shipwrecks over 75 years old are given blanket protection. This has 
worked well in terms of providing clarity for heritage managers, divers, treasure hunters 
and marine developers in knowing what the compliance requirements are – significance 
is still a factor in terms of a finder’s reward or assessing intervention, but it is not the 
primary purpose of the system.66 
 
 
3. Acceptance of other broad cultural heritage definitions 
 
The definition of UCH in the Convention is consistent with what the UK subscribes to 
both nationally and internationally. The UK has ratified the European Convention on 
the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage 1992 (Valletta Convention),67 which has 
a broad definition of archaeological heritage. Article 1 provides that archaeological 
heritage ‘shall be considered to be elements of the archaeological heritage all remains 
and objects and any other traces of mankind from past epochs.’ This lacks a significance 
criterion, but the UK is still a State party.   
More recently in the UK Marine Policy Statement (MPS),68 published in 2011, 
a very broad definition of the historic environment includes ‘all aspects of the 
environment resulting from the interaction between people and places through time, 
including all surviving physical remains of past human activity, whether visible, buried 
or submerged.’ 69  This is a much wider definition than the Convention’s historic 
‘character’ criterion. The MPS distinguishes between all remains, and those elements 
that have been identified as ‘holding a degree of significance’, which it calls ‘heritage 
assets.’ 70  The MPS indicates that marine planning authorities should consider 
undesignated assets subject to the same policy principles as those that are designated.71 
It seems that the UK could easily continue this approach in conformity with the 
Convention.  
                                                 
64 Firth (n 60) 20.  
65 G Henderson, ‘Significance assessment or blanket protection?’ (2001) 30(1) The International Journal 
of Nautical Archaeology 3.  
66 ibid 4.  
67 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Valletta Convention, Revised) 
ETS No. 143.  
68 Marine Policy Statement (n 55). 
69 ibid 21, emphasis added.  
70 It defines ‘significance’ as the value of a heritage asset to this and future generations because of its 
heritage interest, which may be archaeological, architectural, artistic or historic, which remains a very 
broad definition. 
71 ibid 22.  
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Finally, a consultation on the marine planning system in England noted that 
planners would be expected to take account of the principles set out in the Annex of the 
Convention.72 If there is an expectation for the Rules to be applied to heritage in the 
UK’s territorial sea, this narrows the gap between the Convention and UK law further 
still.  
It is clear from this analysis that it is the UK’s interpretation which is 
problematic, rather than the definition of UCH itself. The Convention does nothing 
more than place a duty on States to ensure that activities conform to archaeological 
guidelines if they are both directed at UCH and likely to disturb or damage such objects. 
Even then, States are able to act in accordance with their capabilities. The Convention 
does not require the UK to designate any more wrecks than it deems appropriate, or 
regulate every single activity involving UCH. Given that the number of wrecks falling 
within the Convention’s scope is significantly lower than originally anticipated, the 
number of activities that require regulation will also be lower. Although this may 
require some administrative changes, it should not be too onerous for the UK to execute 
given that a marine licensing system already exists for other activities. This should no 
longer be employed as a reason to justify non-ratification and should not delay a review 
of the Government’s position.  
 
 
B. Erosion of the Sovereign Immunity Principle 
 
Sovereign immunity is granted to State-owned vessels that are used for non-commercial 
purposes, for example, warships.73 This principle of international law is enshrined in 
UNCLOS, where Articles 95 and 96 provide that warships and State-owned vessels 
used on non-commercial service have ‘complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any 
State other than the flag State.’ 74 However, international law rules do not address 
whether sovereign immunity applies to sunken State vessels. Wrecked warships are 
understandably controversial for political and emotive reasons; they may carry objects 
vital to national security, munitions, or pose risks to diver safety or the environment. 
Many of them are the gravesites of soldiers lost in battle, whose relatives may still be 
living.  
In the UK’s view, sunken State vessels retain sovereign immunity unless they are 
expressly abandoned,75 even if they lie in the high seas or within the jurisdiction of 
another State. This means that a coastal State cannot permit interference with the wreck 
site without the express authorization of the flag State. Whilst Article 2(2) of the draft 
UNESCO Convention initially excluded Stated-owned wrecks,76 they were included in 
                                                 
72 Consultation on a Marine Planning System for England (DEFRA, July 2010) 20, n 41. It would be 
reasonable to assume that the devolved nations may also take this approach. 
73 See The Parlement Belge (1880), 5 P.D. 197. 
74  Arts 17, 58(2) UNCLOS. See also Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Concerning the Immunity of State-Owned Ships and Additional Protocol (adopted 10 April 1926 and 24 
May 1934, entered into force 8 January 1937) 176 LNTS 199; Arts 8(1) and 9, Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas (adopted 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September 1962) 450 UNTS 11; and Art 16, 
UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (adopted 2 December 2004, 
not yet in force). The concept of sovereign immunity was also upheld by ITLOS in The ARA Libertad 
Case (Argentina v Ghana) [2012] ITLOS Rep 21.  
75 Protection and Management of Historic Military Wrecks outside UK Territorial Waters: Guidance on 
how existing policies and legislation apply to historic military wreck sites (DMCS and the Ministry of 
Defence, April 2014) 7. 
76 Garabello (n 30) 110-11.   
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the final text’s scope. To exclude them would have diminished the Convention’s regime 
as a lot of UCH are also, by proxy, State-owned vessels. With their inclusion, the UK 
perceived the Convention as restricting flag States’ rights in respect of sunken State 
vessels, as clarified in its explanation of vote:   
 
The United Kingdom considers that the current text erodes the fundamental 
principle of customary international law, codified in [UNCLOS] … of Sovereign 
Immunity … in a way unacceptable to the United Kingdom.77 
 
For the UK, and many other States,78 the problematic provisions are Article 7(3):  
 
Within their … territorial sea, in the exercise of their sovereignty ... States Parties, 
with a view to cooperating on the best methods of protecting State vessels and 
aircraft, should inform the flag State Party to this Convention and, if applicable, 
other States with a verifiable link, especially a cultural, historical or 
archaeological link, with respect to the discovery of such identifiable State 
vessels and aircraft.79  
 
and Article 10(7), which refers to foreign wrecked warships in the EEZ and on the 
continental shelf: 
 
‘Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Article, no activity 
directed at State vessels and aircraft shall be conducted without the agreement 
of the flag State and the collaboration of the Coordinating State.’80 
 
States argue that Article 7(3) does not confer an obligation on the coastal State to 
inform the flag State of any discoveries. Proposals by the UK, Russia and France to 
make the coastal State’s consultation with the flag State mandatory were rejected during 
negotiations. 81  The problem with Article 10(7) is that the Convention does not 
explicitly preclude Coordinating State82 interference with foreign wrecked warships in 
the EEZ and on the continental shelf owing to the inclusion of paragraphs 2 and 4.  
This section addresses a number of relevant questions relating to these 
reservations, the analysis of which should reassure the UK, and other States, of the 
Convention’s position with regard to wrecked warships:  
1. Does sovereign immunity extend to sunken warships?  
2. Do Articles 7(3) and 10(7) of the Convention alter this position in any way?  
3. Is the Convention more effective than the sovereign immunity principle in 
protecting wrecked warships?  
The final question specifically addresses the advantages of the Convention over the 
sovereign immunity principle in protecting war wrecks, emphasizing the need for the 
UK to re-prioritize ratification of the Agreement.  
 
                                                 
77 UK Explanation of Vote (n 33).   
78 States’ explanations of votes and statements are reproduced in Garabello (n 30) 239-53. 
79 Emphasis added.  
80 Emphasis added.  
81 The UK and Russia (31 C/COM.IV/DR.5) and France (31 C/COM.IV/DR.4) attempted to change the 
word ‘should’ to ‘shall’ a few days before the final vote. 
82 The Convention does not refer to ‘coastal State’ anywhere in the text, however, the coastal State is the 
default Coordinating State under Art 10(3) unless it opts out of doing so.  
  13 
1. Extension of sovereign immunity to wrecked warships 
 
Some commentators deem that once sunk, a vessel fails to retain its status as a ‘ship’ 
and consequently does not retain its immunity.83 UNCLOS does not define ‘ship’, but 
Article 29 describes a ‘warship’ as being ‘under the command of an officer’ and 
‘manned by a crew’, which does suggest that the ship must be afloat to fall within the 
definition. 84  Similarly, the 1989 Salvage Convention defines a ‘vessel’ as being 
‘capable of navigation.’ 85  For these reasons, inter alia, Ronzitti has stated the 
customary nature of this principle is doubtful.86  
Upon examining UNCLOS in a broader context, the definition of a warship only 
becomes relevant when differentiating between provisions relating to warships and all 
other ships. 87 Many States with strong views on extending sovereign immunity to 
wrecked warships have ratified both UNCLOS and the Salvage Convention;88 they 
could not have intended that these Conventions would limit their immunity to warships 
and government vessels afloat. 
There is also the argument that immunity should apply only to recently sunk 
vessels. Forrest debates that ‘while there are legitimate security and national 
intelligence reasons for granting exclusive flag State jurisdiction in the case of recently 
sunken State-owned vessels, these considerations do not, however, apply to sunken 
State-owned vessels that fall within the definition of [UCH].’ 89  However if it is 
contended that wrecked warships fail to retain their immunity, as they are not manned 
‘ships’ or capable of navigation, then in applying this logic even recently wrecked 
vessels could not retain sovereign immunity as ‘warships’. There must be another 
theoretical basis for wrecked warships to retain their immunity.  
It seems more reasonable to submit that immunity is only retained as long as 
necessary to protect State interests, but who decides when such interests no longer 
require protecting? Most States tend to agree that immunity no longer applies if 
ownership in the shipwreck is expressly abandoned or relinquished. 90  Dromgoole 
views this as having transgressed into customary law,91 and La Belle and Le Corossol 
both demonstrate the necessity of an express abandonment of ownership.92 It could be 
viewed that express abandonment by a State would be an implicit statement that it no 
                                                 
83 See generally, L Caflisch, ‘Submarine Antiquities and the International Law of the Sea’ (1982) 13 
NYIL 3, 22, L Migliorino, ‘The Recovery of Sunken Warships in International Law’ in B Vukas (ed), 
Essays on the New Law of the Sea (University of Zagreb 1985) 251, N Ronzitti (Rapporteur), ‘The Legal 
Regime of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-owned Ships in International Law’ (Session of Rhodes, 
Greece 2011) 74 Yearbook of the Institute of International Law 133, 143.  
84 It should also be noted that immunity is also extended under Art 29 UNCLOS to ‘other government 
ships operated for non-commercial purposes’ for which a definition is not provided. 
85 International Convention on Salvage (adopted 28 April 1989, entered into force 14 July 1996) 1953 
UNTS 165 (Salvage Convention) Art 1(b). 
86 Ronzitti (n 83). The Rapporteur of the IDI’s 9th Scientific Commission drafted a Preliminary Report, 
which was discussed at the Rhodes Session in 2011, following which a Resolution was adopted by the 
Tallinn Session in 2015.  
87 For example, Art 107 UNCLOS provides that only warships (and other named vessels) may seize on 
account of piracy.  
88 For example, the UK and Russia have ratified both Conventions.  
89 C Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (Routledge 2011) 
336. Ronzitti agrees with this principle; Ronzitti (n 83) 143. 
90 See Federal Register, Volume 69, Number 24 (Thursday, 5 February, 2004) 5647-8.  
91 S Dromgoole, ‘The Legal Regime of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-owned Ships in International 
Law: The 2015 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International’ (2015) 25 IYIL 181, 190. 
92 G Le Gurun, ‘France’ in S Dromgoole (ed), The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: 
National Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001 (2nd ed, Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 92-3. 
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longer needs to protect its interests through sovereign immunity, meaning the decision 
is made by the State itself on a case-by-case basis.  
There is other evidence in international law that a sunken warship does retain 
its sovereign immunity. In conventional international law, and as an appendage to the 
sovereign immunity principle, the 1989 Salvage Convention explicitly does not apply 
to State-owned vessels,93 and the recently in force Wreck Removal Convention94 also 
excludes ‘any warship or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time 
being, only on Government non-commercial service, unless that State decides 
otherwise.’95 This would fit the idea that wrecked warships retain their immunity. 
In terms of customary international law, there is evidence of general State 
practice, whether or not it could be considered sufficiently consistent. The majority of 
major maritime States prescribe to the view that sunken warships retain sovereign 
immunity once sunk and have conducted themselves to this effect. 96 For instance, 
former US President Clinton explicitly stated that, ‘the United States retains title 
indefinitely to its sunken State craft unless title has been abandoned or transferred in 
the manner Congress authorized or directed.’97 Past disputes have also been resolved 
by interstate agreements with the same principle. For example, in 1989, the UK and 
South Africa made an exchange of notes whereby South Africa recognized British title 
to the HMS Birkenhead located in its waters. 98 In 2003 an agreement was signed 
between the USA and France, giving the latter official title to the wreck of La Belle, 
sunk in 1686 off the coast of Texas. In 2011, the US 11th Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed that Spain was entitled to a presumption of immunity over the Nuestra Señora 
de las Mercedes, sunk off Portugal in 1804, under Section 1609 of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act 1976.99  
With regard to opinio juris, many States have declared that they act in 
accordance with the ‘rule of international law’ that sovereign immunity is retained. For 
example, ‘the United States recognizes the rule of international law that title to foreign 
sunken State craft may be transferred or abandoned only in accordance with the law of 
the foreign flag State.’100 Germany states that ‘under international law, warships and 
other … State vessels and aircraft continue to enjoy sovereign immunity after 
                                                 
93 Art 4(1), Salvage Convention. Upon ratifying in 1994, the UK entered a reservation in accordance 
with Art 30(1)(d) that would allow UCH to be excluded from the remit of salvage law and the Convention. 
It has not yet chosen to exercise this right.  
94 Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks (adopted 18 May 2007, entered into force 
14 April 2015) 46 ILM 694. 
95 ibid Art 4(2).  
96 Such States include the USA, France, Germany, Japan, Russian Federation, Spain and the UK. See 
Federal Register (n 90) for full statements.  
97 ‘Presidential Statement on United States Policy for the Protection of Sunken State Craft’ 19 January 
2001, Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton, vol. III, page 2956, Jan. 19 2001. Reprinted 
Federal Register (n 90).   
98 Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of South Africa concerning the regulation of the terms of 
settlement of the salvaging of the wreck of HMS Birkenhead (Pretoria, 22 September 1989) 1584 UNTS 
321. For further examples, see MJ Aznar-Gomez, ‘Treasure Hunters, Sunken State Vessels and the 2001 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’ (2010) 25 IJMCL 209, 221-3. 
Aznar-Gomez gives examples relating to Italy, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Singapore, 
Canada, Russia and Japan. 
99 The first such claim was made by Spain in 2000, where a federal appeals court in Virginia awarded 
ownership of La Galga and Juno to Spain rather than a treasure hunter who had spent nearly $2million 
on preliminary recovery work and fees. Spain was supported by the UK and the USA.  
100 Federal Register (n 90), emphasis added.  
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sinking,’101 and Russia views that ‘under international law of the sea all the sunken 
warships and government aircraft remain the property of their flag State.’102 Domestic 
law103 and other State documents104 could also be considered as evidence of such 
practice. It is clear that States believe they have legal authority to act in this way, and 
so the existence of opinio juris could be argued.  
The Institut de droit international’s Resolution on ‘The Legal Regime of 
Wrecks of Warships and Other State-Owned Ships in International Law’ (‘IDI 
Resolution’) 105  confirms wrecked warships’ immune status. Article 3 states that 
‘sunken State ships are immune from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag 
State.’ Although the theoretical basis for this is unclear, the travaux préparatoires 
appear to favour either State ownership106 or the public property status 107 of such 
wrecks as justifications for immunity, rather than being immune by virtue of being 
‘warships.’108  
Finally, whilst the concept of submerged war graves does not currently exist in 
international law, it is customary international humanitarian law to respect, protect and 
properly maintain war graves 109 – jus in bello applies. Although there is no strict 
definition of the term ‘war graves’, it is understood to be a broad concept.110 It is clear 
there are many possible theoretical bases for wrecked warships to retain sovereign 
immunity. 
 
 
2. Does the Convention alter this position? 
 
Although customary status is likely, it is difficult to say with certainty in the absence 
of judicial confirmation. What is important to note is that the UNESCO Convention 
does not modify any principle of sovereign immunity from that which may already 
exist. According to Article 2(8), ‘... nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as 
modifying the rules of international law and State practice pertaining to sovereign 
immunities, nor any State’s rights with respect to its State vessels and aircraft.’ States 
should be reassured that the Convention does not alter any existing principle of 
immunity.  
Article 3 also notes that the Convention shall generally ‘be interpreted and 
applied in the context of and in a manner consistent with international law, including 
[UNCLOS].’ The UK states that the Convention alters the balance of coastal/flag State 
rights in UNCLOS, but incompatibility with UNCLOS is virtually impossible. Article 
30(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)111 provides that when 
                                                 
101 ibid, emphasis added.   
102 ibid, emphasis added. 
103 Sunken Military Craft Act 2005 (10 U.S.C. Section 113 et seq.) confirms that the USA does not lose 
ownership (and thus sovereign immunity) of a warship merely through the passage of time.  
104 MOD Guidance Document (n 75).   
105 Ronzitti (n 83) 371. 
106  As such vessels are State property, ownership remains with the State unless title is expressly 
transferred or abandoned. 
107 This view is supported by the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property 
2004 (n 74).  
108 Ronzitti (n 83) 142-5.  
109 J Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1: Rules 
(ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2006), Rule 115. 
110 A Petrig, ‘The war dead and their gravesites’ (2009) 91 IRRC 341, 344. 
111 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331. 
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a treaty specifies that it is not to be considered incompatible with another treaty, the 
provisions of the other treaty prevail.  
The two problematic articles for States are Articles 7(3) and 10(7), reproduced 
in full above. Article 7(3) appears to fall short of placing an obligation on the coastal 
State to inform the flag State of any warship discoveries and there are concerns that 
informing any other States with ‘verifiable links’ could dilute the principle of sovereign 
immunity. Again, this should be read in conjunction with Article 2(8), which dictates 
that rules relating to immunity are not modified. This reinforces the fact that express 
State consent is a requirement. Similarly, Article 2(2) provides that State parties shall 
cooperate in the protection of UCH. This echoes the general provision in Article 303(1) 
UNCLOS, which provides that States have the duty to protect UCH objects found at 
sea and shall cooperate for that purpose. Should the coastal State neglect to inform the 
flag State of the discovery, it would surely breach both provisions. 
The concept of a ‘verifiable link’ in Article 7(3) is particularly useful where the 
age or quality of a vessel makes it difficult to identify whether it is indeed a State 
vessel.112 It still gives the potential flag State the right to be notified and consulted, and 
ensures that the coastal State cooperates with the flag State in guaranteeing the best 
possible protection for UCH. Similarly, where other States with ‘verifiable links’ may 
be contacted, for example State interests in cargo or crew, an opportunity is presented 
to cooperate in protecting the wreck.113  
Although Article 10(7) provides that no activities shall be directed at warships 
without flag State consent, this is subject to paragraphs 2 and 4. Both paragraphs are 
examined in detail in Section 3 below, but Article 10(2) appears to give coastal States 
a broad right to prevent or authorize activities directed at UCH, including warships, in 
its EEZ and continental shelf; whilst Article 10(4) limits the scope of sovereign 
immunity by allowing coastal State to act prior to consultation. The former does not 
give the coastal State title over UCH in its territory, implicitly or otherwise. It is a 
necessary inclusion to balance the legitimate rights and sovereign interests of States, 
and simply restates the competence that States already have under UNCLOS to prevent 
interference with their sovereign rights.114 The latter provision actually upholds the 
principle of immunity. The coastal State can take immediate action only to prevent 
damage to the UCH. This means that the coastal State can prevent looting or other 
damage to the foreign warship, thus preserving the wreck and its sovereign status.   
 
 
3. Is the Convention more effective than the sovereign immunity principle? 
 
Although the UNESCO Convention does not modify any international law or State 
practice relating to sovereign immunity, not all jurists subscribe to the notion that a 
sunken warship retains its immunity. The theoretical basis for sovereign immunity over 
wrecked warships is ambiguous, meaning that enforcing the UK’s position in every 
jurisdiction could prove problematic. Relying on this principle to effectively protect 
                                                 
112 Dromgoole notes that for older wrecks, it may be difficult to determine whether they were used 
exclusively in public service. S Dromgoole, Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 156.  
113 The HMS Swift, a British wreck in Argentina, should serve as an example of the cooperation of States. 
See D Elkin, ‘HMS Swift: Scientific Research and Management of Underwater Cultural Heritage in 
Argentina’ in R Grenier, D Nutley, and I Cochran (eds) Underwater cultural heritage at risk: Managing 
natural and human impacts (UNESCO 2006) 76-8.  
114 For example, Art 73(1) UNCLOS. 
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wrecked warships leaves the UK dependent upon the cooperation of other States to 
apply it uniformly. 
Sovereign immunity may also be redundant in protecting sunken vessels if they 
have been subsequently sold for scrap, as most States perceive that immunity is lost 
when title is abandoned.115 Many military wrecks have already been sold by the UK, 
such as those lost in the Battle of Jutland.116 Following calls to prevent the warships 
from being salvaged by a Dutch company,117 the UK believed that as they had been 
sold for scrap following sinking, they were no longer sovereign immune and so there 
was little it could do to prevent interference.118  
The UNESCO Convention will provide protection for wrecked warships in 
these circumstances, making its ratification a priority. State vessels and aircraft are 
defined in Article 1(8) as ‘warships, and other vessels or aircraft that were owned or 
operated by a State and used, at the time of sinking, only for government non-
commercial purposes, that are identified as such and that meet the definition of [UCH].’ 
It is notable that this definition makes reference to the ship’s ownership and/or usage 
at the time of sinking. This suggests that a ship’s status at the point of foundering is a 
determining factor in whether it is a ‘State vessel’ for the purposes of the Convention, 
and this is significant.  
Unlike sovereign immunity, which States agree can be lost through 
abandonment, a vessel’s status at time of sinking is a fact in law that cannot be 
transferred or lost. Provided that a State is able to positively identify the remains of its 
State vessels and give assurance of its status as a non-commercially operated vessel, 
State interest would remain under the UNESCO Convention in spite of whether 
immunity has been lost.119 Anyone seeking to direct activities at such wrecks would 
have to seek the flag State’s permission. This is also a much broader definition than the 
IDI Resolution, which requires usage and ownership of a vessel meaning ships under 
charter at the time of sinking may fall outside its provisions. If the vessel is not easily 
identifiable, the concept of a verifiable link in Article 7(3) discussed above would still 
ensure the potential flag State can remain involved.  
As long as States are party to the Convention, sovereign immunity is not strictly 
required to prevent interference with sunken warships. Had the UK and the Netherlands 
been State parties, UK approval would have been required for any activities directed at 
the Jutland wrecks, which were on active duty when they sank. Additionally, as 
commercial exploitation is also excluded by the Convention, Dutch-flagged vessels 
salvaging for profit would also have breached its provisions.120 Human remains must, 
too, be respected under Article 2(9) and Rule 5 of the Annex. The Convention provides 
a level of protection beyond what sovereign immunity can offer wrecked warships. This 
should be reason enough for the UK to reconsider its viewpoint on ratification.  
As a major maritime State, the UK has a large number of State wrecks. 
Approximately 3500 date up to 1945, with 45% of those located in other 
                                                 
115 Federal Register (n 90).   
116  Over 6,000 British soldiers were killed in the battle off the coast of Norway, in addition to 
approximately 2,500 German soldiers. These wrecks came within the Convention’s scope in 2016.  
117 See generally, R Booth, ‘Battle of Jutland war graves ‘vandalised’ by illegal metal scavengers’ The 
Guardian (London, 18 September 2016), I McCartney, ‘The Battle of Jutland’s Heritage Under Threat: 
Commercial salvage on the shipwrecks as observed 2000 to 2016 (2017) 103(2) The Mariner’s Mirror 
196. 
118 HL Deb 28 November 2012, vol 741, col 118.   
119 The wreck would also need to fall within the definition in Art 1(1) of the Convention.   
120 Arts 2(7) and 4, and Rule 2 Annex do not permit the operation of salvage law where the aim is 
commercial exploitation of the UCH.  
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jurisdictions.121 Domestic laws are insufficient to protect these wrecks beyond the UK’s 
maritime limits. Despite being able to designate wrecks as protected under the PMRA 
1986 regardless of their location, the statute only applies to British passport holders 
and/or British flagged vessels. In 2014, the UK Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport and the Ministry of Defence published a guidance document on the treatment of 
historic military wreck sites outside UK territorial waters.122 Although the document 
contains good guidelines for protection,123 it does not contain binding legal provision 
and nor would foreign jurisdictions have to comply.  
Reliance on sovereign immunity alone is insufficient in the absence of clear 
jurisprudence indicating customary international law status. Even with this 
confirmation, it is likely that immunity only applies where the flag State has not 
abandoned title. Where a wreck is no longer immune, it would generally be subject to 
the law of salvage. For example, when the UK became aware of the salvage of Jutland 
wrecks, HMS Indefatigable and HMS Queen Mary in 2010 and 2011 respectively, it 
was concluded that no further action could be taken.124 It is clear that the only real way 
to safeguard such wrecks is through international agreement; the UNESCO Convention 
provides a way to do this without modifying law and State practice in relation to 
sovereign immunity. The UK’s position should be reviewed as a matter of urgency. 
Other States that initially held the same concerns about the Convention have 
seen that it does not modify sovereign immunity in practice, for example Spain, which 
ratified the treaty in 2005. Aznar-Gomez states that informal conversations have taken 
place with Mexico, Japan, Chile and the Philippines with regard the status of several 
Spanish sunken vessels in their respective territorial waters.125 France, which also holds 
the view that sovereign immunity is retained,126 ratified in 2013, and the Netherlands 
has been seriously considering ratifying the Convention.127 Fears that the flag State will 
not be informed of discoveries are unfounded, and incidents of unauthorized 
intervention by other States are rare. 
As analysed above, sovereign immunity for wrecked warships is not yet a fully 
established customary norm; certainly, this is true for those wrecks that fall within the 
domain of archaeological law. Coupled with the consideration that immunity no longer 
operates where State ownership has been abandoned, the principle may not be the most 
effective method to protect such wrecks. Enforcing it could be difficult or unfeasible in 
some circumstances. The Convention can protect wrecks where title has been lost as it 
defines a warship by its status at the time of sinking; thus, it avoids affording a 
theoretical basis for the extension of sovereign immunity. Far from diminishing the 
principle of immunity for wrecked warships, it strengthens protection and upholds State 
interests by safeguarding them beyond what can be achieved by relying on sovereign 
immunity alone. Given this, it does not modify any immunity that may already exist in 
international law and explicitly stipulates as much. The UK can continue its practice of 
regarding wrecked warships as immune, but its accession to the Convention would 
mean that any abandoned State wrecks would also be afforded protection as ‘warships’. 
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124 Warships: Wrecks: Written Question – 352, Commons (Asked 28 May 2015, Answered 1 June 2015). 
Presumably the Government believed it could not take action as the ships have been sold and immunity 
lost, see HL Deb 28 November 2012, vol 741, col 118. 
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Given that many of these wrecks have already been irreparably damaged, and the illegal 
and unethical salvage of warships remains ongoing,128 the UK Government should 
consider their protection an ‘immediate priority’129 and reconsider its indefinite hiatus 
on reviewing the Convention.  
 
 
C. Compatibility with UNCLOS  
 
Having examined the Convention’s definition and its treatment of wrecked warships, a 
third concern of the UK is that the Convention extends coastal State jurisdiction beyond 
the powers prescribed by UNCLOS, allowing for a creeping jurisdiction. The ghost of 
creeping jurisdiction haunted debates during the negotiations.130 For some States the 
notification and reporting of UCH on the continental shelf was a natural consequence 
of protection, but others saw this as an infringement of international law, incompatible 
with UNCLOS.131 This fear of a creeping coastal State jurisdiction was strengthened 
by the fact that some developing countries had previously advocated a 200nm 
jurisdictional zone over many activities and resources, leading to a suspicion that some 
States had jurisdictional ambitions extending beyond the protection of UCH.132 In its 
explanation of vote, the UK stated, 
 
[The introduction of] new elements of coastal State jurisdiction in respect of 
underwater cultural heritage located in the exclusive economic zone and on the 
continental shelf beyond 24 nautical miles from baselines … [would not] be in 
full conformity with UNCLOS.133  
 
Of concern are Articles 9(1)(b) and 10, particularly paragraphs 2 and 4. Together 
they contain a complex three-step procedure for reporting, consultation, and protective 
measures.134 To the UK and other concerned States, these articles appear to bestow new 
jurisdictional powers upon coastal States in their EEZs and contiguous zones beyond 
what is conferred in UNCLOS. This section analyses both provisions to determine the 
accuracy of this interpretation.  
 
 
1. Article 9(1) UNESCO Convention 
 
The problem is the ‘constructive ambiguity’135 adopted in Article 9(1)(b), a deliberate 
equivocation to try and accommodate varying views regarding jurisdictional powers of 
the coastal State. One issue that arises in relation to this provision is the use of the term 
‘State Party’ in relation to rights and obligations under the Convention. It is unclear 
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disappearing WWII shipwrecks’ The Guardian (London, 3 November 2017). See also, Lamb (n 21).  
129 DCMS Statement (n 20). 
130 See generally Garabello (n 30) 138-54.   
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whether these rights attach to the coastal State in whose waters the vessel is located, or 
to the flag State of the vessel. 
 
(a) a State Party shall require that when its national, or a vessel flying its flag, 
discovers or intends to engage in activities directed at [UCH] located in its [EEZ] 
or on its continental shelf, the national or the master of the vessel shall report 
such discovery or activity to it;  
(b) in the [EEZ] or on the continental shelf of another State Party:  
(i) States Parties shall require the national or the master of the vessel to report 
such discovery or activity to them and to that other State Party;  
(ii) alternatively, a State Party shall require the national or master of the 
vessel to report such discovery or activity to it and shall ensure the rapid and 
effective transmission of such reports to all other States Parties.  
 
This lack of clarification is a concern for many States. If the flag State has this 
power, then the Article does nothing more than give effect to the existing right of flag 
States to have their own nationals and vessels report to them – this is based on the active 
personality principle in international law, and arises from principles of nationality 
rather than territory. However, if ‘State Party’ could be interpreted as the coastal State, 
Article 9 would give coastal States the power to require notification of discoveries or 
activities directed at UCH in their contiguous zone or EEZ. This would be a new 
competence awarded outside of the UNCLOS framework,136 which many States find 
unacceptable. The deliberate ambiguity used to move forward with the Convention, 
despite a lack of consensus on the issue, has been a block for several major maritime 
States.137 The UK was unwilling to ratify in the absence of a clear interpretation.  
Articles 31-33 VCLT138 can be used as a means of interpreting treaties where 
provisions are unclear. Article 31(1) provides that ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ In order to provide context, the 
text and any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty can be considered.139 
If a plain reading of the text of Article 9 is made, it simply outlines the duty of the flag 
State to ensure its vessels report any discoveries or activities. The chapeau of the article 
seems to confirm this.140  
Paragraph 1(a) refers to a State’s national, vessel and maritime zones, meaning 
that the State party mentioned here is both the flag State and the coastal State. Paragraph 
1(b) refers to another State party’s maritime zones, i.e. not those of the flag State. 
Presumably then, ‘that other State Party’141 also refers to the same State, that is, the 
coastal State. Given that the coastal State is the other State party, then the obligation to 
require reporting as set down in the provision must be read as falling on the flag State.142  
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‘Subsequent practice’ also provides context for interpreting a treaty, and is defined 
by the ILC as ‘conduct in the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty.’143 
Article 31(3)(b) VCLT and the ILC both indicate that there must be collective 
agreement as to how a provision should be interpreted. This would be difficult to apply 
here, as no subsequent practice has yet emerged; certainly, no collective practice exists. 
Only one report of a wreck has been made to UNESCO, and as such there is no practice 
to aid in the interpretation of Article 9(1)(b).144 However, a draft of the Operational 
Guidelines prepared by the Secretariat in 2009 attempted to provide some clarification 
on Article 9(1):145  
 
‘When the concerned heritage is located in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of 
another State Party the State Party requires such reports to be sent 
(a) either to it and to the other (Coastal) State Party; or  
(b) only to it. In this case it ensures the rapid and effective transmission of such 
reports to all other States Parties.’146   
 
Nevertheless, the sentiment amongst States was that the above paragraphs did not 
exactly reflect Article 9(1)(b),147 and that the guidelines should not try and rewrite or 
interpret the treaty.148 It was completely altered for the eventually adopted Operational 
Guidelines to remove any explanation of the provision.149  
Finally, the context for interpretation can include any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.150 It seems logical that States would 
opt for an interpretation that is consistent with UNCLOS, which the majority of State 
parties have ratified. UNCLOS allows for ‘other international agreements and rules of 
international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical 
nature.’151 This could be understood as also covering the UNESCO Convention. In the 
same vein, the UNESCO Convention itself provides that the treaty is not incompatible 
with UNCLOS,152 and so with this in consideration, Article 9 must be interpreted in 
such a way that is not irreconcilable with UNCLOS. Article 311 UNCLOS provides a 
special procedure for the conclusion of agreements modifying or suspending the 
operation of UNCLOS provisions.153 As this procedure was not strictly followed during 
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the UNESCO Convention negotiations, it must be deduced that all States involved did 
not consider the Convention to modify or suspend the operation of any UNCLOS 
provisions.154  
In order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty, 
may be consulted.155 An Advisory Report prepared by the Netherlands in considering 
ratifying the treaty maintains that the ambiguity starts in the negotiations, therefore 
there is no point consulting the preparatory works.156 However, it is somewhat useful 
to know the origins of Article 9 in the travaux préparatoires.157  
The proposal for the wording of Article 9 was put forward by the USA. The idea 
was that a State could decide either for simultaneous notification to the flag State and 
coastal State, or alternatively, only to the flag State, which would then ensure 
transmission of the report to other State parties. 158  However, the wording was 
ambiguous, leaving the provision open to a number of interpretations. The 
interpretation allowing creeping jurisdiction was swiftly rejected by the authors,159 but 
a number of other States welcomed the opportunity for a constructive ambiguity.160 
A last-minute proposal by the UK, France and Russia attempted to remove the 
ambiguity by clarifying Article 9(1)(b) and proposing two amendments to the text.161 
This clarified that it is the flag State which has the right to require reporting, for 
instance, the amendment to sub-paragraph (ii) provided ‘a State Party shall require its 
national or master of a vessel flying its flag to report such discovery or activity to it and 
shall ensure the rapid and effective transmission of such reports to all other State 
Parties.’ The USA supported this move, stating that ‘Article 9(1)(b)(ii) can only be read 
as an obligation on flag States in regard to its own nationals and flag vessels.’162 Despite 
being defeated by a large majority, Garabello states that ‘the interpretation emerging 
from [the proposed amendment] is to be preferred for Art. 9, para. 1 (b) (ii), in 
conformity with the preparatory works.’163 Although the ambiguity in the provision 
does indeed extend from the travaux préparatoires, the intention of the authors of the 
draft provision was that ‘State Party’ should be read as ‘flag State’, not ‘coastal 
State’.164  
The ILC states that the supplementary means referred to in Article 32 also include 
‘conduct by one or more of the parties in the application of the treaty after its 
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conclusion.’165 Although State practice is severely limited, a number of State parties 
have issued declarations under Article 9(2) regarding the manner in which reports will 
be transmitted under Article 9(1)(b). 166  Algeria, Cuba, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and 
Ukraine all require reporting to the flag State in the first instance, subsequently 
transmitting the information to other States by various means. Argentina, Italy and 
Portugal have all declared that they will report in accordance with Article 9(1)(b)(ii), 
and although they do not clarify which State party a vessel should report to, it is difficult 
to foresee a situation in which the coastal State is notified but the flag State is not. 
Whilst these States prefer to retain the flexibility of an ambiguous provision, no party 
has expressly declared that it will require reporting to the coastal State, either solely, or 
simultaneously with the flag State under Article 9(1)(b)(i). The Dutch Advisory Report 
considers it unlikely that a State party will impose a duty to notify coastal States given 
the different interpretations by States.167 
The conclusion that emerges from the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT 
suggests an implicit understanding that only the flag State that can require notification. 
Nevertheless, the travaux préparatoires indicates that the constructive ambiguity in 
Article 9 was clearly intentional and was not intended to have a strict interpretation. In 
the absence of consistent and collective subsequent practice, potential State parties will 
not be able to confirm an exact interpretation, yet this should not impede them from 
ratifying. Most States are party to UNCLOS, Article 303(2) which also has a 
jurisdictional constructive ambiguity; this is not seen as a problem. The ambiguity in 
Article 9 should be seen as a flexibility, allowing States with a range of views on 
jurisdictional powers to ratify. States can make their individual approach clear by 
entering a declaration under Article 9(2) upon signature or ratification, making a choice 
where their report will be sent to. The UK could ratify the Convention, declaring that 
reports will be submitted to the flag State in the first instance.  
Declarations exist exactly for this concern and purpose; to clarify the State’s position 
on the understanding or interpretation of a provision, without excluding or modifying 
the treaty’s legal effect. The UK has utilised declarations to clarify its understanding of 
jurisdictional issues when ratifying other agreements, for example, the UN Straddling 
Fish Stocks Agreement. 168  If the UK does make a declaration on the UNESCO 
Convention, it would simply be acting in accordance with its past conventional activity. 
It is therefore difficult to see why the UK cannot take similar action with this treaty, 
and it should not pose an obstacle to reviewing its position on the Convention.   
 
 
2. Article 10(2) UNESCO Convention 
 
Because of its nature, UCH is often irreversibly entwined with natural resources on the 
seabed. Most shipwrecks, particularly ones which fall under the Convention’s 100 year 
criteria, have transformed into habitats for various species after many years underwater. 
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Article 10(2) is understood to be an explicit recognition of that link.169 It reaffirms that 
a State can exercise its sovereign rights to prevent interference with its natural 
resources, and implicitly suggests that in doing so, could use this as a mechanism to 
protect UCH.170 This ‘innovative’ right afforded to the coastal State to prohibit or 
authorize activities directed at UCH is in no way granted under UNCLOS, 171 
suggesting another jurisdictional creep: 
 
A State Party in whose [EEZ] or on whose continental shelf [UCH] is located has 
the right to prohibit or authorize any activity directed at such heritage to prevent 
interference with its sovereign rights or jurisdiction as provided for by 
international law including [UNCLOS]. 
 
In practice, the provision merely has a declaratory nature. It only permits States to 
prohibit or authorize activities directed at UCH to prevent interference with its 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction provided for by international law, including 
UNCLOS.172 Article 56 UNCLOS sets out the coastal State’s sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction in the EEZ, and under Article 58(3), it has the right to adopt laws and 
regulations in accordance with UNCLOS to safeguard those rights. Article 77 sets out 
sovereign rights over the continental shelf and provides that coastal States can authorize 
and prohibit activities of other States in relation to these rights. Article 10(2) merely 
gives effect to a right already created by UNCLOS. O’Keefe states that ‘even if such 
prohibition or regulation has the incidental effect of protecting [UCH], there is no issue 
of ‘creeping jurisdiction’ or contravention of the provisions of UNCLOS.’173 
It has been questioned whether the wording ‘to prevent interference’ in paragraph 
2 implies that measures can be taken against activities which may interfere with 
sovereign rights, not simply ones that do. This would give States broad discretion to 
take measures against a number of activities that may or may not interfere with their 
sovereign rights. The Netherlands in particular had disagreed with the phrase ‘prevent 
interference’ during negotiations, favoring ‘will interfere’. 174  However, the norm 
cannot be used to provide extensive protection to UCH.175 The right is limited to the 
prevention of interference with the coastal State’s sovereign rights or jurisdiction. The 
actions of a coastal State making excessive use of its rights under Article 10(2) to 
provide extensive protection to UCH could, in principal, be challenged before a court 
or tribunal.176 Recourse to dispute resolution under Article 25 of the Convention is 
available for State parties.  
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3. Article 10(4) UNESCO Convention 
 
Article 10(4) was an equally thorny point during negotiations in terms of coastal State 
jurisdiction, despite being the ‘cornerstone’ of the Convention.177 As with the previous 
two provisions above, the argument centres around the latitude given to coastal States. 
Some States considered that any special role attributed to the coastal State would run 
counter to UNCLOS.178 As a result, the term ‘coastal State’ is not used anywhere in the 
Convention, rather the text refers to a ‘Coordinating State’. Considerable apprehension 
remains over such a concept, which is seen as a whitewashing of additional coastal 
State jurisdictional competences in the EEZ and continental shelf. Subsequently, States 
such as the UK have a number of concerns about the role of the coastal State and the 
scope of practicable measures it could unilaterally take. The provision, prima facie, 
allows the coastal State to act prior to consultation with other interested States, taking 
limitless measures in doing so:179  
 
Without prejudice to the duty of all States Parties to protect [UCH] by way of 
all practicable measures taken in accordance with international law to prevent 
immediate danger to the [UCH], including looting, the Coordinating State may 
take all practicable measures, and/or issue any necessary authorizations in 
conformity with this Convention and, if necessary prior to consultations, to 
prevent any immediate danger to the [UCH], whether arising from human 
activities or any other cause, including looting… 
 
Paragraph 4 must be read in the context of the entire article. Concerning the 
granting of more powers to the coastal State, Article 10(3)(b) provides that the coastal 
State does not necessarily have to be the Coordinating State. There is a choice for 
another State to coordinate consultations if the coastal State cannot do so.180 This means 
that any perceived extension of jurisdiction cannot be attributed to the coastal State. 
This is confirmed by Article 10(6), stating that any action taken cannot constitute a 
basis for any jurisdictional rights not provided for in international law, including 
UNCLOS. There is also a clear difference in the language in this provision and in 
paragraph 2 above, which specifically discusses the coastal State taking measures to 
protect interference with its own rights.  
Having the coastal State be the default Coordinating State makes sense. 
Geographically it is the closest, and already has rights and jurisdictions in the area over 
other things.181 Scovazzi recognizes that it would have been illusory to grant this right 
to the flag State, considering the risk of activities carried out by flags of convenience.182 
The coastal State’s role is simply the coordinator, and this certainly does not prevent 
the flag State from taking action with its own vessels to prevent immediate danger to 
UCH in the EEZ or continental shelf of another State party. 183  In practice, the 
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designation of a default Coordinating State allows protective measures to move fairly 
quickly, without having to negotiate who the Coordinating State is in the first instance.  
Article 10(3) places an emphasis on consultation with other interested State 
parties,184 with Article 10(6) providing that the Coordinating State must act on behalf 
of the State parties as a whole and not in its own interest.185 All interested State parties 
must be consulted in relation to the protection of UCH unless there is immediate danger, 
and even then, it must be for the benefit of all States. This provides that the scope of 
practicable measures to be taken cannot be unlimited. The authorization of any activity 
under paragraph 4 would also have to conform to the Rules in the Convention’s Annex.  
Although the UK and the USA strongly disagreed on paragraph 4, as it allowed the 
coastal State to take unilateral action,186 it is sensible to have an urgent measures 
procedure in place to enable States to adequately protect vessels in immediate danger. 
There must be some enforcement mechanism in the Convention or it would be 
somewhat of a paper tiger. Negotiations have the capacity to be lengthy and time 
consuming,187 and there is a danger of losing the UCH if efficient action is not taken. 
For example, if a State happens across a foreign vessel looting UCH, it cannot afford 
to take time to consult other States; it must act quickly. Considering the adamant 
inclusion of ‘looting’ in the provision,188 it is clear that these are the kinds of activities 
envisaged to fall within the scope of this paragraph. This is also pursuant to the general 
duty to protect UCH in Article 303(1) UNCLOS. 
Although the text of Article 10 is clumsy, it does not extend any new competences 
to the coastal State. Dromgoole believes that Article 59 UNCLOS could help bolster 
the legitimacy of the Coordinating State role.189 Article 59 provides for the resolution 
of disputes where UNCLOS does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State 
in the EEZ and a conflict of interest arises between States. As such disputes must be 
resolved on the basis of equity and in the interest of the international community as a 
whole, the Coordinating State ‘acts on behalf of interested States [and] strengthens the 
argument that the interests of the coastal State and those of the international community 
are fundamentally one and the same.’190 
Incompatibility with UNCLOS has been a significant stumbling block for State 
ratification, illustrated by the controversial Articles 9 and 10. The French ratification is 
significant in this respect. It had also been opposed to any expression of creeping 
jurisdiction that intended to modify the framework set out in UNCLOS.191 It favoured 
an ad hoc approach of establishing bilateral and multilateral treaties to serve the 
interests of UCH on the continental shelf and on the EEZ, rather than this extension of 
the coastal State’s jurisdiction.192 The Netherlands’ perspective is also useful, given 
that it, too, initially felt that the Convention afforded extra competences to the coastal 
State.  
The Dutch Advisory Report states that Article 10 simply gives more substance to 
protect UCH on the EEZ and continental shelf through cooperation, and that the system 
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in Article 10(6) sufficiently safeguards against abuse of the provision. The Netherlands 
feels that Article 10 could be regarded as implementing Article 303(1),193 and the State 
is currently working to ratify the Convention. This change in States’ attitudes towards 
the Convention should serve as a workable example for the UK and other States with 
similar concerns, whilst also explicitly evidencing that these States have made 
underwater heritage a priority.  
 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Upon finalizing the text of the Convention, the UK declared that it could not 
ratify the Agreement as it viewed some significant issues to be insurmountable. This 
paper has illustrated that these perceived problems with the Convention should no 
longer be considered a barrier to accession. The UK has misinterpreted the 
Convention’s purpose, believing that the treaty contains a very broad definition of 
UCH. Although several administrative and policy changes may be necessary to 
adequately monitor some activities falling within the Convention’s scope, it certainly 
does not require designation of all UCH in the territorial sea. On the point of sovereign 
immunity, although customary status of the rule is likely, it is not confirmed and so 
cannot be unquestionably relied upon to protect wrecked warships; and, relatedly, 
immunity may not be effective in protecting UCH where State ownership has been 
abandoned in any case. Notwithstanding the fact that the Convention does not alter any 
immunities from those which may already exist, it does offer protection beyond that of 
immunity for wrecked warships where title has been lost or transferred.  
Finally, in spite of the fact that some provisions appear to create new 
competencies for coastal States, no evidence of this exists in practice. Certainly, this 
author takes the view that the Convention is reconcilable with UNCLOS. States could 
take a narrower approach to these provisions, entering a declaration to that effect upon 
accession and ensuring that their favoured interpretation is adopted through consistent 
practice. State parties have a valuable opportunity to contribute to the Convention’s 
practice that, evidently, non-parties do not possess. Given many States’ reserved 
positions on these jurisdictional clauses, it is likely that a more conservative approach 
will be taken in practice in any case. Although this ability to shape the interpretation of 
the text would be a particularly useful tool for provisions where the UK has previously 
held objections, the Convention does not depart from the UNCLOS jurisdictional 
regime as discussed throughout this paper.194 
Having shown in this article that the UK’s key objections are either unfounded 
or surmountable, ratification of the Convention would seem to be a logical progression. 
Although not a perfect Convention by any means, reflected by the difficult negotiations 
and clunky text, it is certainly a significant step forward as regards UCH protection. 
The treaty’s fairly flexible provisions allow States to form management processes in 
accordance with their individual positions, and given the UK’s former concerns, its 
membership could provide new impetus for other States to reconsider the Convention. 
The success of the UNESCO Convention depends upon its players. At the time 
of adopting the text in 2001, some notable flag States considered that the preservation 
of the UNCLOS status quo outweighed the benefits of the preservation of UCH. In the 
resulting fifteen years, States have progressively moved to protect UCH in the wake of 
                                                 
193 Netherlands Advisory Report (n 153) 10.   
194 The UK’s ratification, alongside the likely accession of the Netherlands, would serve as confirmation 
of this. 
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destruction of such objects, and appreciation of the issues has grown since the UK’s 
legal team initially considered the Convention. Against this background, the DCMS’ 
announcement that the review of the Government’s position on ratification has been 
postponed indefinitely 195  is a monumental retrograde step. Whilst this paper 
demonstrates that the legal issues can be overcome; for the UK, the political will to 
ratify will be the key hurdle.196 Given that the UK’s departure from the European Union 
is on the horizon, much of the Government’s resources will be focused on this new 
challenge. This focus should not come at the expense of our heritage. 
With overwhelming national interest in the two world wars especially, the 
protection of UCH remains a priority. Having already reached the centenary of WWI, 
a significant number of wrecks worldwide are now falling within the scope of the 
Convention. As argued in this paper, domestic law and a reliance on sovereign 
immunity offer insufficient protection for safeguarding these wrecks, making 
exploitation of these sites a very serious prospect. WWII shipwrecks are already 
disappearing at the hands of salvage divers,197 meaning timely reconsideration of the 
Convention is crucial. The loss of our underwater heritage, much of it carrying the 
remains of soldiers lost in combat, should be a priority for the Government.  
UCH is not a renewable resource. Once it is disturbed or recovered, the 
archaeological knowledge that it can provide may be lost forever. Artefacts can be 
damaged, and important contextual information destroyed.198 If efforts are not made to 
preserve this knowledge, the only winners are the looters. One of Steinbeck’s characters 
asked, ‘how will we know it’s us without our past?’199 Unless States such as the UK 
make the protection of underwater heritage a priority, we may never truly know.  
 
 
 
                                                 
195 DCMS Statement (n 20). 
196 The Impact Report referred to in the introduction of this paper discusses the necessary administrative 
and policy changes, and the majority of the substantive clauses of the Convention present no difficulty 
to the UK. See Final Report (n 12) 71, 83. 
197 See, for example, Holmes, Ulmanu and Roberts (n 128). 
198 Recording the particular location of the artefacts and their proximity to other artefacts and the ship’s 
hull are significant in preserving the entire time capsule, as this location information could be important 
for revealing history and culture. See, O Varmer, ‘The Case Against the “Salvage” of the Cultural 
Heritage’ (1999) 30(2) JMLC 279, 289.  
199 J Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (Penguin Classics 2000) 111.  
